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TOURO LAW REVIEW
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Rojas1 69
(decided July 20, 1995)
The defendant, Luis Kevin Rojas, was convicted of second
degree murder and other related charges and appealed the
conviction, asserting that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel as guaranteed under the New York State170 and
Federal1 71 Constitutions. 172 The Appellate Division, First
Department reversed the conviction and remanded the case to the
Supreme Court, New York County holding that defendant's trial
counsel overlooked certain exculpatory evidence which may have
established the defendant's innocence. 173
Luis Kevin Rojas was convicted of murder in the second
degree, criminal facilitation in the second degree, assault in the
first degree, and possession of a weapon in the first and second
degree. 174 The charges stemmed from a shooting death that
occurred approximately five blocks from where the defendant
was apprehended. 175 Numerous discrepancies existed concerning
the time and location of defendant's arrest and the time and
location of the shooting. 176 Rojas asserted that evidence existed
concerning violations of the right to counsel because of a prohibition of
attorney-client contact during a recess supports the majority view.
169. 630 N.Y.S.2d 28 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1995).
170. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision states in pertinent part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel.. . ." Id.
171. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to ... have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Id.
172. Rojas, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 29.
176. Id. at 32-33. The defendant claimed that he arrived at the scene of
arrest, a subway station, approximately seven minutes prior to the shooting
incident, which had occurred five blocks away. Id. at 32. Furthermore,
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which would have proven that it was impossible for him to have
perpetrated the crime. 177
In his motion to vacate the judgment of conviction, 178 the
defendant claimed that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney overlooked evidence which would
have tended to prove his innocence. 179 The defendant's counsel
made no effort to investigate any aspect of his alibi and, in fact,
never gave the notice required for an alibi defense. 180
Furthermore, he asserted that defendant's counsel "not only made
no effort to investigate the ... evidence or the defendant's alibi,
but further committed numerous errors during the course of the
trial which tended to implicate defendant rather than prove his
innocence." 181 The defendant contended that his counsel
according to the defendant, his arrival at the station was witnessed by various
police officers performing a "fare beating" sting operation. Id.
177. Id. at 32-33. The police department "911" tapes were available which
pinpointed the exact time of the shooting. District Attorney "Squad tapes"
which detailed the exact time the arresting officers first arrived at the train
station were also accessible. Id.
178. N.Y. CRiN. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 1993). This section
provides in pertinent part: "At any time after the entry of a judgment, the
court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such
judgment.. . ." Id.
179. Rojas, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 32. The defendant's counsel, Mr. Fronefield,
failed to interview PATH police officers who could have verified that the
defendant was at the station several minutes prior to the shooting. Id. It was
also shown that Mr. Fronefield ignored segments of a "911" tape in which an
eyewitness's description of the suspect was distinctly different than Rojas'
physical description. Id. at 34.
180. Id. at 32. N.Y. CRBI. PROC. LAWV § 250.20(1) (McKinney 1993). This
provision states in pertinent part:
At any time, not more than twenty days after arraignment, the people
may serve upon the defendant or his counsel ... a demand that if the
defendant intends to offer a trial defense that at the time of the
commission of the crime charged he was at some place or places other
than the scene of the crime, and to call witnesses in support of such
defense, he must, within eight days of service of such demand, serve
upon the people ... a "notice of alibi" ....
Id.
181. Id. at 34 (emphasis added). The defendant's counsel, Mr. Fronefield
continually used the defendant's name while referring to the perpetrator. Id.
During the cross examination of a witness, rather than inquiring if the witness
19961 1067
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 12 [2020], No. 3, Art. 47
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/47
TOURO LAW REVIEW
overlooked all of the exculpatory evidence and instead chose to
defend Rojas by presenting character evidence. 182
Subsequent counsel, obtained by defendant following his
conviction, conducted an in-depth investigation into the
defendant's alibi. 183 The results of this investigation led the
appellate court to conclude that "[t]he evidence ... certainly
raises genuine questions as to defendant's participation in the
crime. This evidence was not presented before the jury and could
have persuaded them that reasonable doubt existed as to
defendant's guilt."1 84
The court initially began its analysis of the "ineffective
counsel" issue by stating that, although there is a constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel, there is "no set litmus test
for determining what constitutes ineffective or inadequate legal
representation." 185 In People v. Ellis,186 the court of appeals
acknowledged that "[t]rial lawyers bring their own talents,
experience and personality into the courtroom, and given the
unique attributes of each case, must devise and execute
appropriate strategy." 187 In the earlier decision of People v.
had seen the suspect in certain distinctive clothing, Mr. Fronefield asked
"[y]ou saw Mr. Rojas or the man in the orange jacket at that point, isn't that
right .. . ."Id.
182. Id. The only witnesses called by Mr. Fronefield were Rojas' "high
school counselor, photography teacher and biology teacher." Id.
183. Id. at 32-33. The investigation consisted of having someone run the
distance from the shooting scene to the subway station to determine if it were
possible to get there within the time parameters calculated by the "911" tapes
and the eyewitnesses. Id. at 33. The investigators for defendant's new counsel
interviewed the police officers who were present when the defendant arrived at
the station. Id. Statements from these officers indicated that it was possible that
the defendant was at the PATH station prior to the shooting, making it
virtually impossible for him to have been at the shooting scene. Id. Further,
the defendant's physical condition was inconsistent with someone who had just
run five blocks. Id.
184. Id. at 33.
185. Id. at 34.
186. 81 N.Y.2d 854, 856, 613 N.E.2d 529, 530, 597 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624
(1993).
187. Id. The Ellis court held that the defendant's trial counsel had displayed
"reasonable trial strategy" and as such his conduct was not deemed ineffective.
1068 [Vol 12
3
et al.: Right to Counsel
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
RIGHT TO COUNSEL1
Baldi,188 the court reasoned that "trial tactics which terminate
unsuccessfully do not automatically indicate ineffectiveness." 189
The Rojas court stated that their most critical concern when
determining "the existence of ineffective counsel is to
avoid... confusing true ineffectiveness with mere losing
tactics. "190
The Rojas court, however, did hold that the "right 'to effective
representation includes the right to assistance by an attorney who
has taken the time to review and prepare both the law and the
facts relevant to the defense.'" 19 1 The Rojas court based this
standard, in part, on the New York Court of Appeals' decision in
People v. Bennett. 192 In Bennett, the defendant's attorney,
according to the court, was "so completely unfamiliar with either
the facts or the law bearing on his client's case as to doom the
defense to failure." 193 Although the Bennett court agreed that no
Id. at 857, 613 N.E.2d at 530, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 624; see also People v. Baldi,
54 N.Y.2d 137, 146, 429 N.E.2d 400, 404, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 897 (1981).
The Baldi court stated that "[w]hat constitutes effective assistance is not and
cannot be fixed with yardstick precision, but according to the unique
circumstances of each representation." Id. But see People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d
394, 398, 380 N.E.2d 272, 274-75, 408 N.Y.S.2d 444, 447 (1978). The court
articulated two standards for determining an attorney's effectiveness. First, it
stated the traditional standard where the court will look at "whether the
attorney's shortcomings were such as to render the trial a 'farce and a mockery
of justice.'" Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d at 146, 429 N.E.2d at 404, 444 N.Y.S.2d at
897 (quoting People v. Brown, 7 N.Y.2d 359, 361, 165 N.E.2d 557, 558, 197
N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 821 (1961)). Second, it
stated the newer, stricter standard, where the court must determine "whether
the attorney exhibited 'reasonable competence.'" Id.
188. 54 N.Y.2d 137, 429 N.E.2d 400, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1981).
189. Id. at 146, 429 N.E.2d at 405, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 898 (explaining that
"[slo long as the evidence, the law and the circumstances of a particular case,
viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the
attorney provided meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement
will have been met").
190. Rojas, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
191. Id. at 35 (quoting People v. Droz, 39 N.Y.2d 457, 462, 348 N.E.2d
880, 882, 384 N.Y.S.2d 404, 407 (1976)).
192. 29 N.Y.2d 462, 280 N.E.2d 637, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1972).
193. Id. at 465, 280 N.E.2d at 638, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 803. In Bennett, the
defendant had been previously committed to a mental hospital for an extended
1996] 1069
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precise definition of "inadequate" or "ineffective" counsel exists,
it held that:
[T]he right of a defendant to be represented by an attorney
means more than just having a person with a law degree
nominally represent him upon a trial and ask
questions .... [Tihe defendant's right to representation does
entitle him to have counsel "conduct appropriate investigations,
both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be
developed, and to allow himself time for reflection and
preparation for trial." 194
New York courts and federal courts are fairly consistent in
their holdings concerning matters of effective assistance of
counsel. In Reese v Georgia,195 the United States Supreme Court
held that the right to counsel means the right to effective
assistance of counsel. 196 In Strickland v. Washington, 197 the
Court articulated the federal standard for determining what
constitutes effective assistance of counsel. The Court reasoned
that "[a]n accused is entitled to be assisted by an
attorney ... who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial
is fair." 19 8 Thus, the Court in Strickland held that "[t]he proper
period of time. Id. Further, he had attempted suicide on numerous occasions
both before and after the commission of the current charge of robbery first
degree. Id. Despite these obvious doubts about the defendant's mental
capacity, the attorney failed to prepare an insanity defense. Id. at 464-65, 280
N.E.2d at 637-38, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 802-03.
194. Id. at 466, 29 N.E.2d at 639, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 804 (citations omitted).
See People v. Rodriguez, 94 A.D.2d 805, 462 N.Y.S.2d 914 (2d Dep't 1983).
Despite overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, the Rodriguez court
held that the defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel where
his attorney failed to call an exculpatory witness and failed to object to
incomplete evidence. Id. at 807, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
195. 350 U.S. 85 (1955).
196. Id. at 90 (stating "[t]he effective assistance of counsel in ... [capital
cases] is a constitutional requirement of due process which no member of the
Union may disregard").
197. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
198. Id. at 687-88 (stating "counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty
to avoid conflicts of interest... [c]ounsel also has a duty to bring to bear such
skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing
process").
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measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms... whether counsel's
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." 199
The Court, however, did go on to clarify that this standard was
merely a guide, in that "[n]o particular set of detailed rules for
counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of
circumstances faced by the defense counsel or the range of
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant."200
Although New York has not adopted the "reasonable
competence" standard articulated in Strickland, the courts do
require a similar standard. Taking each case into consideration
for its uniqueness, the New York courts look at the totality of
circumstances to determine whether counsel provided
"meaningful representation. "201
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. DeFreitas202
(decided Aug. 14, 1995)
Defendant claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
arguing that his attorney failed to request a charge of a lesser-
included offense, failed to request that a Huntley hearing be
reopened and failed to assert that defendant had been
"framed." 203 The defendant asserted that the inaction of his
attorney amounted to a denial of his rights under the Federal 204
199. Id.
200. Id. at 688-89 (holding that there is a "strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance").
201. People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 429 N.E.2d 400, 405, 444
N.Y.S.2d 893, 898 (1981).
202. 213 A.D.2d 96, 630 N.Y.S.2d 755 (2d Dep't 1995).
203. Id.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This provision states in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... have the assistance of counsel for
his defence." Id.; see Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (holding that
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